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ABSTRACT
Objectives: To explore how information and data are
used to monitor patient safety and quality of primary
care by professionals working in, or supporting,
primary healthcare.
Design: Qualitative study of semistructured interviews
with a directed content analysis of transcripts.
Setting: North-West London, UK.
Participants: 21 individuals from various levels of the
primary healthcare system were recruited, including
general practitioners, practice nurses, practice
managers, members of Clinical Commissioning Group
(CCG) governing bodies, and senior members of
regional patient safety teams.
Results: Participants described being overwhelmed
with complicated data which lacked any meaningful
analyses about safety and quality. There was also a
lack of clarity over which patient safety events are
expected to be reported or monitored. Participants also
reported uncertainty on whose responsibility it was to
act on patient safety information or concerns. At the
practice level, there was a range of disincentives for
responding to and acting on safety issues and
concerns, with few reported benefits. Participants
made recommendations to improve future monitoring.
Conclusions: There is a need for clearer information
in the form of specific guidelines, policies and
procedures with regard to who monitors patient safety
in primary care, what is monitored and how it should
be monitored.
INTRODUCTION
It is estimated that between 37 and 600 patient
safety incidents occur in UK primary care per
day.1 Despite this, the nature and extent of
harm in primary care are still not well under-
stood.1 2 Beyond the basic reporting and pub-
lishing of quality and safety outcome indicator
data,3 it is also unclear how primary care orga-
nisations, such as Clinical Commissioning
Groups (CCGs), their member practices and
local NHS England area teams, collaborate to
monitor patient safety. Past primary care
patient safety research often has a tightly
focused area of enquiry such as general
practice computer systems or E-prescribing,4–6
incident reporting7 and safety culture.8 9
However, primary care is diverse, complex and
collaborative,10 and a less top-down approach
has been recommended.11 Additionally,
studies that indicate ways to improve patient
safety systems4 tend to assume that provision of
an improved system is sufﬁcient for its uptake,
which is not necessarily the case,6 12 especially
given the unprecedented time and resource
demands on UK primary care staff.13 14 There
exists an opportunity to consult primary care
staff for a realistic picture of whether and how
they collaborate to monitor patient safety.
Drawing on the tradition of qualitative enquiry
into patient safety,4 6 this study uses informant
interviews in North-West London (NWL) to
explore how patient safety is currently moni-
tored in primary care settings. Patient safety is
deﬁned as the “reduction of risk of unneces-
sary harm associated with healthcare to an
acceptable minimum”.15
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ This study employed a multiprofessional partici-
pant group at various levels of the primary care
system, providing a more realistic account of the
complexities of monitoring patient safety in
primary care.
▪ The interview topics were focused on current
barriers and facilitators to monitoring patient
safety which, combined with the use of a direc-
ted content analysis, allowed an in-depth explor-
ation of what works and what does not work for
patient safety monitoring in primary care.
▪ Participants offered detailed and specific recom-
mendations to improving the use of data to
monitoring patient safety in primary care.
▪ These findings may not be generalisable to other
healthcare agencies and organisations involved
in primary care that were not represented in this
study.
▪ This study took place in North-West London and
the results may not reflect the experiences of
those working in other areas.
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METHODS
Study design
This study used in-depth semistructured interviews
which were suited to exploratory aims of the study.16 An
interview guide was used to ensure that some core ques-
tions were asked of all participants, but also allowing
ﬂexibility to follow-up novel information.17
Participants and procedures
Twenty-one individuals participated in the study.
Individuals working in general practitioner (GP) prac-
tices and those supporting and monitoring the delivery
of these services (CCG governing body members and the
NHS England regional patient safety and quality teams)
in NWL were eligible for the study. Email invitations were
distributed to members of the governing bodies of the
eight NWL CCGs. Snowballing was employed through
the use of email lists to CCG-member GP practices which
allowed for identiﬁcation and access to further relevant
professionals. This method is useful when the sampling
frame is unknown and traditional random sampling is
implausible.18 Once data saturation was reached after 21
interviews,19 no further participants were recruited.
Data collection
Interviews took place between June and September 2014
in a private ofﬁce at the participants’ workplace.
Interviews ranged from 29 to 47 min and were audiore-
corded. Interviews were conducted by one member of
the research team (RS) who had previous training in
interviewing healthcare staff and holds a PhD in applied
psychology. Participants were informed that RS was a
research associate and did not hold any clinical or man-
agement roles in any healthcare organisations. The
interview guide was piloted on the ﬁrst three partici-
pants. For all interviews, participants were asked to ﬁrst
provide their own description of patient safety, and then
instructed to consider patient safety as relating to when
a patient has been harmed or injured as a result of their
care or lack of care. An interview guide is included
(box 1). This study was a service evaluation20 and there-
fore did not require NHS Research Ethics Committee
approval,21 but local research governance permissions
were sought. Participants were given a study information
sheet and their informed consent was obtained.
Data analysis
Interview transcripts were subjected to a directed
content analysis,22 a form of thematic analysis in which
some coding categories are predetermined in line with
the aims of the study.23 24 These predeﬁned categories
were: the current methods of identifying patient safety
events; perceived barriers and facilitators; and recom-
mendations for the future. Transcripts were coded by
one member of the research team (RS). Any other rele-
vant statements were given new codes at this stage,
which culminated in the ﬁnal coding framework. The
coded data were investigated for relationships which
linked them. These became subthematic-level data and
relationships between subthematic data became the
overarching main themes. The ﬁnal thematic framework
(box 2) was developed by one researcher.
RESULTS
Twenty-one individuals participated in the study (table 1).
The three main themes are presented with data from the
interview transcripts (with the participant identiﬁer) to
reﬂect the main points of interest.
Theme 1: access to information and data
Participants reported an overwhelming number of per-
formance measures which did not reﬂect patient safety
Box 1 Interview guide
1. What does the phrase ‘patient safety’ mean to you?
2. Can you describe any ways of identifying cases where there
have been medical errors or patients have been harmed by
their care?
3. Are there any ways of sharing information about patient safety
events or near misses with others who work in primary care?
Prompts: Can you describe these?
How often does this happen?
4. If there was a growing concern where the same patient safety
adverse event was occurring in a particular area/practice/your
practice, how would this usually be flagged up to you?
5. Are there any ways in which you think the data supporting
patient safety in primary care could be improved?
Prompt: Do you think these analyses adequately represent
trends in patient safety and quality of care?
6. With the information and feedback channels that exist, do you
feel that primary care practices where there are safety issues
are currently being identified with a good degree of accuracy?
Prompts: Why/why not?
How could this be done better?
7. In terms of monitoring patient safety in primary care, what
makes this difficult for you?
8. Are there any things that would make it easier to monitor
patient safety in primary care?
Box 2 Thematic framework: monitoring patient safety in
primary care
1. Access to information and data
A. The overwhelming number of performance measures
B. Variability in receiving patient data in the general practi-
tioner surgery
C. Access to (meaningful) analyses/data about safety
2. Clarity of policies and guidelines
A. Operationalisation of patient safety and patient
safety-related events
B. Local variation in policies and protocols
3. Responsibility and action
A. Ownership of the issue
B. The lack of visible monitoring in primary care
C. Prioritising other pressures over safety and quality
D. Disincentives to report potentially serious incidents
E. Dependence on informal human vigilance and feedback
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but were considered a mechanism for remuneration:
“You get ﬁxated on depression because that’s what
you’re being paid for…So you tend to ignore other
mental health co-morbidities because depressions the
one you’re focusing on” (GP1). Individuals working in
general practice reported not knowing which harms they
should be evaluating to monitor safety: “If they set out
really clearly, ‘we believe that these ﬁve things would
really improve patient safety and so we want you to
report to us, every single medication error, every single
needle stick injury’…We could then do that. I suppose
that’s the problem, it’s just so wide at the moment in
primary care that we’re never really sure” (PM2).
GPs simultaneously spoke of too little and too much
information on discharge summaries (“Lots and lots of
information about various tests that the patients have
had but it’s information that I actually don’t have the
expertise to interpret” CCG3). Not knowing what occurs
to patients after a referral to district nursing was a
concern (“Referral to district nursing—it’s like dropping
it into a black hole. You don’t know if the nurse has ever
seen the patient or whether what you’ve asked to be
done has been done” CCG3). There were issues around
receiving letters/communication in a format incompat-
ible with the system holding the patient records in the
practice, in which case pertinent information was manu-
ally entered into the patient’s record by practice staff
which created a lot of opportunity for error: “If there’s
ten or ﬁfteen medications which is not uncommon with
patients, that could be a really big problem…every pos-
sible error, from transcription error on names of medi-
cation or dosages, lengths of time that the patient’s
expected to be on the medication—be it permanent or
short-term—loads of room for error on that” (GP7).
Participants from NHS England reported that no core
metrics were routinely analysed for safety monitoring (“It’s
very underdeveloped…The honest answer is we don’t have
a set of metrics that we look at” NHSE1). Instead, the
accessible data were manually scanned for red ﬂags. These
data may be discussed at operational group meetings,
which take place every 1 or 2 months, but these meetings
were described as ﬁxated on trying to get through the
information collected through secondary care quality and
safety indicators: “We’re trying to look at those. There’s
hundreds. There’s literally about two hundred. Three
hundred” (CCG7). Participants from management organi-
sations (NHS England, CCG governing boards and the
Commissioning Support Units (CSU)) tended to report
that safety data (such as serious incidents) and complaints
were distributed across and within a number of organisa-
tions (“It’s distributed across NHS England: the revalid-
ation team, the performance list team, the contract
managing team, and so on.”) with recommendations to
collate this information in the future.
Table 1 Interview participant characteristics
Identifier Professional role/s Gender
Job experience
(in years)
CCG1 Clinician* with CCG governing body role Male 24
GP1 GP Male 1
CCG2 Clinician with CCG governing body role Male 8
GP2 GP Female 8
GP3 GP Male 15
CSU1 Safety and quality executive at NWL CSU Female 8
CCG3 Clinician with CCG governing body role Female 18
NHSE1 Safety/quality executive at NHSE Female 1
GP4 GP Female 13
NHSE2 Safety/quality executive at NHSE Female 1
GP5 GP Female 12
GP6 GP Female 12
CCG5 Clinician with CCG governing body role Male 20
CCG6 Clinician with CCG governing body role Male 20
PM1 PM Female 16
GP7 GP Male 25
CCG7 Safety/quality executive in CCG Male 2
NHSE3 Safety/quality executive at NHSE Female 1
CCG8 Clinician with CCG governing body role Female 28
NHSE4 Safety/quality executive at NHSE Male 2
PM2 PM Female 6
*Clinicians—job experience denotes years worked after medical qualification; non-clinician—job experience denotes years worked in current
role.
†In this study, the term ‘clinician’ (practitioners with patient contact) denotes GPs, nurses or secondary care practitioners—exact profession is
not specified as data would be identifiable.
CCG, Clinical Commissioning Group; CUG, Commissioning Support Units; GP, general practitioner; NHSE, NHS England; NWL, North-West
London; PM, practice manager.
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Theme 2: clarity of policies and guidelines
Across participants, there was no consensus on the
meaning of the term ‘patient safety’ in relation to
primary care because the concept was considered vague
or they described it as everything in the medical process:
“It could mean all sorts of things…So it’s everything
actually. Patient safety is everything we do” (GP5).
Additionally, it was not clear what constituted a serious
incident, whether reporting was mandatory and where
to report them. Participants explained that serious harm
and never events had an acute focus and that general
practice was comparatively safer: “You think ‘well, com-
pared to that, our risk is zero’ so it feels like an overreac-
tion to follow some of this process” (PM2). Different
methods for reporting patient safety incidents (such as
emailing or ringing up a local or national team at NHS
England, completing an incident report form from NHS
England, or anonymously reporting through the
National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS))
appeared to result in confusion about which agency the
information was received by and which of these methods
satisﬁed mandatory reporting requirements, even among
those at the CCG governing board level: “I struggle
when I ask the question to get any sense of the mechan-
isms by which GPs might report, or anybody in general
practice might report, the mechanisms by which patients
might report their concerns…I have no idea. And my
suspicion would be that nobody has any idea” (CCG6).
Some GPs reported having carried out informal safety
monitoring evaluations or audits in the past. This type of
monitoring was optional, variable and time-intensive:
“Looking at your prescribing rates compared to some-
body else…GPs are having to do that by hand and that’s
why they might do it one year, skip it another year…you
might be looking at methotrexate and all the anti-
tumour drugs that might be prescribed. So you’re cover-
ing so many areas you do not have time to do every
single one. If somebody could do that and just present
the data” (GP2). Multiple GPs mentioned that they
needed more guidance about which drugs to monitor
and the frequency of medication reviews (especially for
long-term medications and high-risk drugs) for repeat
prescribing. Speciﬁcally, they were interested in: “All the
drugs that patients take where monitoring is recognised
and recommended and then, what are the monitoring
intervals and what are the ranges that are acceptable?”
(CCG2).
Theme 3: responsibility and action
At the management level, there were conﬂicting
responses about whose responsibility it was to monitor
patient safety in primary care. CCG governing body
members generally reported that monitoring safety was
outside of their remit and lay with NHS England,
whereas participants from NHS England saw themselves
as part of a collaborative effort with CCG governing
bodies and the practice networks. There was mention of
the fact that the CCGs do “have this vague responsibility
for quality [improvement] in general practice, whatever
that’s supposed to mean” (CCG3). Participants from
NHS England and the CCG governing bodies also
reported conﬂicting responses about who monitors
patient safety in urgent care centres and for out-of-hours
services, with some GPs stating that it appeared that
nobody was monitoring these services: “And urgent care
centres are making huge amounts of money but the
quality of care—who’s questioning that?…Do we have
any data on the safety of prescribing or drug errors or
prescribing errors in urgent care centres, is anyone
looking at that—even out of hours?” (GP6).
Participants from CCG governing bodies and NHS
England spoke at length about how GP practices
managed their incidents locally and made use of net-
works or peer groups (of 6–11 practices meeting
monthly) to check-up on each other and share informa-
tion. However, participants working in GP practices
reported using these meetings to make sense of recent
changes to policies instead of discussing patient safety.
Additionally, poor performing surgeries may work
together with similar others in order to avoid detection,
referred to as “collusion” (CCG8). Almost all partici-
pants reported that they had local knowledge about
which practices were and were not safe and that the
focus of patient safety monitoring should be on these
types of practices, with some identifying single-handed
or two-handed practices as a cause for concern: “There’s
a pattern of poor performance in men, over 50, who
trained abroad, who didn’t train in the UK, and who are
single handed, small, very small practice and probably
have got poor premises. They’re high indicators of
underperformance…the trouble is the trained abroad
stuff, is politically very sensitive” (NHSE4).
Participants who worked in practices frequently
described the difﬁculty of managing time pressures on
an average working day. GPs reported not having the
time to ﬁll in incident report forms or conduct safety
audits: “Although there are areas where we are asked to
collect data, we’re just so busy and so stretched that we
don’t really do it…We hold the minor surgery service
and in theory we try to run an audit of, or we try to
keep a record of if there’s post-operative infections. But
actually to do that properly, it’s really difﬁcult, so we
don’t do it properly” (CCG2). Many GPs explained that
it was difﬁcult to be safe in a 10–15 min appointment in
which patients often brought multiple serious health
and social concerns to the same appointment due to
having access to care issues: “But I think primary care’s
really dangerous right now to be honest. I am getting
quite near to the feeling that I don’t want to carry on
doing it” (CCG2).
For a number of reasons, the recommended protocol
for dealing with a potentially serious incident was not
always followed: “So what I should be doing is logging it
on that, sending it off to them. To be honest, almost
never happens” (CCG3). Other than lack of time, parti-
cipants feared blame, organisational and personal
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repercussions that were ampliﬁed if the potentially
serious incidents involved a senior GP. Multiple GPs
reported the belief that NHS England would not or
could not act on the evidence, and that this deterred
them: because “the onus is on that GP and so on top of
your normal workload, and for the fear of being isolated
and victimised, who’s going to do that? It’s easier to walk
away from it” (GP6). The failure to report incidents
outside of the practice was attributed to a number of
factors, including a workplace culture that mistakes were
deemed to be “within acceptable limits even though in
fact if one was to have the hard evidence and compara-
tive with what’s going on on a national basis, you might
ﬁnd that you are a complete outlier” (GP7).
Summary
Participants’ report of the barriers to monitoring patient
safety in primary care are outlined in box 3 and their
recommendations for the future are provided in box 4.
DISCUSSION
This study’s ﬁndings demonstrate that patient safety and
patient safety events, such as serious incidents, appear
ill-deﬁned in primary care, and therefore it is unclear
on the ground what is to be monitored. Patient safety
monitoring was perceived to be voluntary, with time and
resource constraints dictating that other tasks frequently
took priority over safety monitoring. At the management
level, the information about patient safety was divided
between, and within, various organisations. There was an
absence of clear and explicit monitoring strategies and
ownership of the issue. This study indicates that there
may be a need to establish a clear focus on patient safety
in primary care, which requires: (1) a detailed operatio-
nalisation of core concepts relating to safety in primary
care; (2) explicit guidance for the monitoring, detection
and reporting of safety concerns is needed for when
events fall outside of well-deﬁned acceptable parameters
and (3) clear dissemination of this information is
needed for all primary care staff (administrative, man-
agerial, clinical, etc) with action points. These ﬁndings
indicate the need to make the patient safety agenda25
more explicit in primary care.
Strengths and weaknesses
This study incorporated a multiprofessional participant
group at different levels of the local healthcare system,
Box 3 Perceived barriers to using data to monitor safety
Perceived barriers
▸ Lack of information about district nursing activity delivered to
patients’ general practitioner (GP)
▸ Lack established regional/national protocols regarding moni-
toring of repeat prescribing or high-risk drugs
▸ Information received from hospitals is too basic or too
complex for GP
▸ Lack of examples of serious harm or never events that are
applicable to primary care settings for which to monitor
▸ Limitations to involvement of salaried and locum doctors with
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) data
▸ Too many inappropriate pop-up warnings on GP clinical
systems
▸ Limited and unreliable data on serious incidents
▸ Lack of specifically allocated time to look at practice-held data
or QOF statistics on patient safety
▸ Local practice network meetings designed for some patient
safety peer monitoring used for other purposes
▸ Organisation holding safety data may not have power to inves-
tigate patient safety threats
▸ Majority of time at operational group meetings dedicated to
hospital patient safety monitoring
▸ Lack of safety metrics routinely analysed at NHS England
(London region)
▸ Limited access to existing safety data as they are divided in
terms of the organisations that hold them and within depart-
ments in these organisations
Box 4 Recommendations for improving data to monitor
safety
Recommendations
▸ For hospital information, clearly outline changes to patient
medical and/or medication status and clearly outline action
plan for general practitioner (GP) follow-up and monitoring
▸ Share copy of district nursing care plan with GP
▸ Hospital information should have READ-codes applied to avoid
error during information transfer
▸ Provide data on missed appointments in other parts of health-
care system to patient’s GP, especially required for those at
high risk (eg, frail, elderly)
▸ Collate all patient safety and quality information (including
complaints) in one source document which is shared within
and between organisations that have a duty to monitor patient
safety.
▸ Provide spreadsheet feedback charts (colour coded: red,
amber, green) on prescribing rates data relating to safety (eg,
non-formulary drugs, drugs with boxed warnings)
▸ Provide list of 5–10 patient-defined safety events for practices
to identify, clinically code in the patient record, and monitor
▸ Supply rapid discharge summaries from hospital for other
serious illnesses (eg, meningitis, sepsis or lower respiratory
tract infections)
▸ Identify all drugs in which monitoring is recognised; provide a
list of the recommended monitoring intervals and acceptable
ranges
▸ Need for computerised automatic safety monitoring audits for
known risks (eg, unsafe combination of drugs, long-term use
of short-term medication)
▸ Provide a one-page outline on what a patient safety event is,
how and where it should be reported for practices to display
in waiting rooms
▸ Provide a safety reporting system for suspected problems
which need further investigation
▸ Provide a safety reporting system which all primary care prac-
tice staff have access to
▸ Up-to-date (live) patient care record shared between all the
patients’ NHS healthcare providers
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resulting in a realistic case study account of the complex-
ities of monitoring patient safety. As a local evaluation
study, the involvement of national bodies such as the
CQC was outside the remit of the present work. The
CQC has recently undergone signiﬁcant changes to its
primary care services team and undertaken a national
consultation on monitoring in GP practices which con-
cluded after the closure of this study.26 This study used
snowball sampling which can result in oversampling
similar members of the population;18 but attempts were
made to access participants in a range of organisations
and professional roles. The present study was conducted
in a local primary care system and may not be generalis-
able to areas other than NWL. The coding and thematic
framework was developed by one researcher and so
offers room for the replication and development of
these themes in future work.
Comparison with other studies
Recent work has identiﬁed the failure to deﬁne quality
in general practice27 and, in a similar vein, this study
adds that this may extend to safety as well as serious inci-
dents in primary care. This lack of shared understanding
regarding concepts central to safe care stands in stark
contrast to creating a National Health Service (NHS) in
which safety is front and centre.25 Concerns were raised
about the failure to monitor out-of-hours care and
urgent care centres, which is consistent with reports that
monitoring these services has not been a priority for
NHS England or the CCGs.28 This study found that
there does not appear to be a systematic analysis of the
vast data set collected on individual practices or a clear
sense of who has the responsibility to act on these data
at the management levels. Therefore, the ﬁndings of
this study support general conclusions from past work
that there has been a long history of poor analysis of
quality and safety data in primary care.29 30 This study
also supports the growing evidence that the increasing
pressures and responsibilities put on GPs and primary
care staff are limiting their ability to deal with issues
related to patient safety.13 14 31
Implications for clinicians and policymakers
An operationalisation of patient safety and serious incidents
speciﬁcally addressing primary care should be explicitly
outlined and available in a succinct format. Primary care
patient safety reports should be accompanied by clear
action points for GP practices. The development and
dissemination of brief standardised guidance regarding
how, and to whom, serious incidents in primary care are
reported is recommended. Participants provided recom-
mendations for improved monitoring of safety, which
have clear implications for practice and policy.
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